



UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

The strategic use of mass migration as a tool of political pressure: A threat to international security or negligence by the Security Council?



CSJBMUN II



Background guide

COLEGIO SAN JOSE DE BARRANQUILLA
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CHAIR PRESIDENT (DAIS) PRESENTATION LETTER

Juliana Duque

Delegates,

At dawn on the Belarus–Poland border, families stood between two lines of armed guards. They were not soldiers. They were not diplomats. They were leveraged. Borders are not just lines on a map; they are decisions.

And in today's Security Council, we are not merely debating borders, we are debating responsibility. Welcome to the United Nations Security Council.

This committee stands at the intersection of power and consequence, where international humanitarian obligations collide with strategic interests. The issues before you challenge the very purpose of this body: its capacity to uphold international law while responding to evolving threats that blur the line between security and humanity.

Weaponized migration is not a theoretical concept, it is a deliberate strategy with real human cost, and the 2021 Belarus–Poland border crisis stands as a precedent that demands serious scrutiny.

However, this committee is not only about evaluating past actions. We are also confronting an uncomfortable truth: the Security Council, as it currently functions, is often criticized for its limitations, its paralysis, and its inability to respond decisively to emerging forms of coercion. This debate invites you to question whether traditional frameworks are enough, and if not, what new approaches must emerge.

My name is Juliana Duque Aguas, and throughout my academic journey I have sought spaces that push students beyond formulas and memorization, encouraging us to engage with reality, history, and the responsibility of problem-solving in an interconnected world. This committee reflects that same goal. Here, I invite you to go beyond surface-level analysis, beyond predictable rhetoric, and beyond the comfort of consensus.

As a committee we expect rigor, preparation, and intellectual honesty. We expect delegates to engage critically with both the legal and ethical dimensions of international security, recognizing that power without accountability breeds instability. Simplistic answers will not survive this room; thoughtful, well-reasoned, and forward-looking diplomacy will. We invite you to approach this committee not only as representatives of your nations, but as architects of ideas capable of redefining how international security is understood and practiced.

We look forward to a rigorous, respectful, and transformative debate.

Sincerely,

Juliana Duque Aguas

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CHAIR VICEPRESIDENT (DAIS) PRESENTATION LETTER

Samuel Restrepo

Distinguished Delegates,

It is my distinct pleasure to welcome you to this session of the United Nations Security Council. I extend my warmest regards and commend each of you for undertaking the responsibility of representing your nations in one of the UN's most consequential bodies.

Our agenda, "The strategic use of mass migration as a tool of political pressure: a threat to international security or negligence by the Security Council?", challenges us to navigate the delicate intersection between international security and humanitarian responsibility. Through Sub-Topic A, we will examine the Council's capacity to uphold international humanitarian obligations while addressing the security implications of weaponized migration. Sub-Topic B invites us to assess the 2021 Belarus–Poland border crisis as a critical precedent of state-engineered migration used to exert pressure on neighboring states.

As a delegate myself, I understand the intensity of preparation, the pressure of diplomacy, and the challenge of balancing national interests with collective security and human dignity. I recognize the effort each of you has invested in research, position papers, and policy formulation, and I assure you that this dais values substance, diplomacy, and respectful debate above all else.

I encourage you to engage actively, challenge perspectives constructively, and remain mindful of the real human consequences behind the policies we discuss. The Security Council's mandate carries both authority and responsibility, and it is through your informed and principled contributions that this committee will thrive.

I look forward to productive debate, meaningful resolutions, and a session defined by professionalism and collaboration. Should you have any questions or concerns, please do not hesitate to approach the dais.

I wish you the very best for the sessions ahead.

Sincerely,

Samuel Restrepo Arroyo
Vice-President, Security Council

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2. INTRODUCTION TO THE COMMITTEE

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is one of the most powerful and important organs of the United Nations, responsible for maintaining international peace and security. It was created in 1945 following the devastation of World War II, when global leaders recognized the need for a stronger international system to prevent future wars, manage conflicts, and promote cooperation among nations. The Security Council was designed to act quickly and decisively when peace is threatened, making it different from other UN bodies that focus mainly on discussion and recommendations.

The Security Council is composed of 15 member states, divided into two categories. The first group consists of five permanent members—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These countries were given permanent seats because of their political, military, and economic power at the end of World War II, as well as their significant roles in founding the United Nations. One of the most notable features of permanent membership is the veto power, which allows any one of these five countries to block the adoption of substantive resolution, even if all other members support it. This power was intended to ensure cooperation among major powers but has also been criticized for limiting the Council's effectiveness.

The remaining ten members are non-permanent, elected by the UN General Assembly for two-year terms. These seats are distributed by region to ensure geographic representation, allowing countries from Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and other regions to participate in global security decision-making. Although non-permanent members do not have veto power, they play an important role by contributing perspectives, negotiating resolutions, and representing the interests of smaller or developing nations.

The Security Council serves the international community in several key ways. One of its primary functions is to identify and assess threats to peace, including armed conflicts, civil struggles, acts of terror, and humanitarian crises. The Council can call on conflicting parties to settle disputes peacefully through negotiation, mediation, arbitration, or diplomacy. When peaceful solutions are not successful, the Council may take stronger action to enforce its decisions.

3. BACKGROUND OF THE TOPIC

The strategic use of mass migration as a tool of political pressure is an increasingly significant issue in contemporary international relations. While migration has historically been driven by factors such as conflict, persecution, economic inequality, and environmental degradation, recent decades have seen instances in which states have deliberately manipulated or exploited population movements to achieve political or strategic objectives. This phenomenon, often referred to as the “instrumentalisation” or “weaponisation” of migration, occurs when governments encourage, facilitate, or threaten large-scale migrant or refugee flows in order to coerce other states, extract concessions, or retaliate against political pressure such as sanctions or diplomatic isolation. It is essential to distinguish between spontaneous or forced migration driven by structural conditions and cases in which states actively engineer, redirect, or exploit existing migration flows for strategic purposes.

This practice has gained prominence in the post-Cold War era, particularly as traditional military confrontation has become more costly and politically risky. Political scientist Kelly

M. Greenhill describes coercive migration as a form of non-military leverage whereby sending states impose economic, social, and political strain on receiving states by generating sudden migration pressures. These pressures can overwhelm border systems, polarize domestic politics, and fuel anti-immigrant sentiment, thereby creating internal instability in the targeted country. As a result, migration becomes increasingly intertwined with broader security concerns, especially within regions such as Europe and the Middle East, where migration routes cross multiple borders and involve numerous actors.

From the perspective of the United Nations Security Council, the relevance of this issue lies not in migration itself, but in its potential classification as a threat to international peace and security under Article 39 of the UN Charter. Traditionally, the Council has focused on armed conflict, interstate violence, and terrorism; however, the emergence of hybrid and non-traditional security threats has challenged the boundaries of its mandate. The instrumentalisation of migration therefore raises the question of whether deliberate and coercive population movements can meet the threshold required for Security Council action.

Several high-profile cases illustrate how mass migration has been used as a political instrument. One of the most cited examples occurred in 2021, when Belarus was accused of deliberately facilitating the movement of thousands of migrants from the Middle East and Africa toward the borders of Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia. This crisis followed the imposition of European Union sanctions on Belarus over human rights abuses and contested elections. European Union officials framed the situation as a form of hybrid warfare, arguing that migration was being used to destabilize the bloc and pressure it into lifting sanctions. Similar dynamics were observed in May 2021, when Morocco relaxed border controls near the Spanish enclave of Ceuta, allowing over 10,000 migrants to cross within two days amid diplomatic tensions with Spain.

Turkey's relationship with the European Union further demonstrates the strategic dimension of migration. Hosting more than three million Syrian refugees, Turkey has repeatedly emphasized its role as a gatekeeper preventing further migration into Europe. At several points, Turkish leaders suggested that failure by the EU to provide financial support or political concessions could result in reduced border enforcement. Although these refugees were genuinely displaced by conflict, the use of their presence as leverage highlights how humanitarian crises can become entangled with geopolitical bargaining.

For receiving states, the strategic manipulation of migration generates a dual dilemma. International humanitarian and refugee law, particularly the principle of non-refoulement, obliges states to protect those fleeing persecution. At the same time, sudden and politically engineered migration flows can strain border management systems, asylum procedures, and domestic political stability. Measures aimed at deterrence or securitisation may risk violating international legal obligations, while full compliance may intensify internal security and political pressures.

The broader context of global migration underscores why such strategies can be effective. As of 2019, there were approximately 270 million international migrants worldwide, with forced displacement reaching record levels due to conflicts in Syria, Sudan, Ukraine, and other regions. Sudden surges in migration can place enormous strain on receiving states' infrastructure, asylum systems, and political cohesion. In democratic societies, migration often becomes a polarizing issue, influencing elections and empowering extremist or populist movements, thereby magnifying its strategic value as a coercive tool.

The strategic use of migration raises important questions for international security and the role of the United Nations Security Council. While migration itself is not traditionally classified as a security threat under international law, its deliberate manipulation by state actors blurs the line between humanitarian concerns and coercive behavior. Critics argue that the Security Council has failed to adequately address this challenge, as existing international frameworks focus primarily on protecting refugees rather than preventing their exploitation for political ends. Others contend that the Council's limited response reflects structural and political constraints, including disagreements among permanent members, concerns over state sovereignty, and the absence of a universally accepted definition of weaponised migration. The absence of clear mechanisms to deter or respond to such practices has therefore fueled ongoing debate over whether this represents a failure of institutional adaptation to non-traditional and hybrid security threats.

Ultimately, the weaponisation of mass migration represents a complex dilemma for the international community. It involves vulnerable populations who are victims of coercive policies, while simultaneously posing real political and security challenges for receiving states. Whether framed as a threat to international peace or as a governance challenge for institutions such as the Security Council, the issue highlights the evolving nature of power, coercion, and security in a globalized world where human mobility can be transformed into a strategic tool.

4. KEY DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Weaponised / Instrumentalised Migration

- Weaponised (or instrumentalised) migration refers to the deliberate manipulation, facilitation, or exploitation of migration or refugee flows by state actors in order to exert political, economic, or strategic pressure on another state.

Coercive Migration

- Coercive migration describes situations in which population movements are generated or manipulated to impose costs on a target state, thereby influencing its political decision-making without the use of direct military force.

Hybrid Threats/ Hybrid Warfare

- Hybrid threats involve the coordinated use of military and non-military means, including political pressure, economic coercion, disinformation, and humanitarian manipulation, to destabilize another state while remaining below the threshold of armed conflict.

Non-Refoulement

- Non-refoulement is a fundamental principle of international refugee law prohibiting states from returning individuals to territories where they face a risk of persecution, torture, or serious harm.

Threat to International Peace and Security

- A threat to international peace and security refers to situations that risk destabilizing relations between states, escalating into conflict, or undermining regional or global stability, as determined by the United Nations Security Council under Article 39 of the UN Charter.

Threshold of Security

- The threshold of security refers to the point at which a non-traditional issue, such as migration, generates sufficient coercion, instability, or interstate tension to warrant consideration by the Security Council as a matter of international peace and security.

State Sovereignty

- State sovereignty refers to the authority of a state to exercise control over its territory and domestic affairs without external interference, as recognized under international law.

4.1 Contextual Relevance to the United Nations Security Council

While migration and refugee movements are fundamentally humanitarian phenomena, their deliberate instrumentalisation by state actors can elevate them into matters of international peace and security. Under Article 39 of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council is empowered to determine the existence of a “threat to the peace” when a situation generates interstate tension, destabilizes regional security, or risks escalation beyond domestic boundaries. Weaponised migration meets this threshold not because of the movement of people itself, but because of the coercive intent and strategic manipulation behind it. When a state deliberately induces or facilitates mass migration flows in order to pressure another state, retaliate against sanctions, or extract political concessions, migration ceases to be a purely humanitarian issue and becomes a form of non-military coercion. Such practices can overwhelm border systems, inflame domestic political polarization, undermine bilateral relations, and provoke retaliatory measures, thereby increasing the risk of broader instability.

In this context, failure to recognize and address state-engineered migration risks normalizing a hybrid tactic that exploits vulnerable populations while eroding the foundations of international peace and collective security. Despite this potential relevance, the Security Council has faced significant political and structural obstacles in responding effectively to weaponised migration. The absence of a universally accepted legal definition complicates efforts to establish intent and assign responsibility to state actors. Concerns over state sovereignty under Article 2(7) of the UN Charter further limit willingness to treat migration as a security issue rather than a domestic matter. Political divisions among permanent members, particularly when alleged perpetrators are strategic allies or veto-wielding states, also constrain collective action. At the same time, Council members remain cautious that securitising migration could undermine international refugee protection frameworks and set precedents that justify restrictive or unlawful migration policies. As a result, the Council has often adopted reactive or fragmented approaches, exposing a governance gap in addressing non-traditional and hybrid threats.

At the core of this issue lies a fundamental dilemma: formally recognizing the instrumentalisation of migration as a security threat risks blurring the distinction between genuine refugees and coercive state practices, potentially undermining humanitarian protections; yet failing to address the issue allows the continued exploitation of vulnerable populations and the escalation of interstate tensions. Navigating this balance between humanitarian responsibility and collective security remains one of the central challenges for the Security Council in addressing weaponised migration.

5. SUBTOPICS

5.1 Subtopic A: Evaluating the Security Council's Capacity to Uphold International Humanitarian Obligations While Addressing the Security Implications of Weaponised Migration

The instrumentalisation of migration presents a profound challenge to the United Nations Security Council, as it lies at the intersection of humanitarian protection and international security. While migration and refugee movements are, by nature, humanitarian phenomena rooted in conflict, persecution, and instability, their deliberate manipulation by state actors for political or strategic purposes introduces a security dimension that falls within the Council's mandate. Subtopic A examines whether the Security Council possesses the institutional capacity and political willingness to respond effectively to weaponised migration while remaining faithful to its international humanitarian obligations.

The Security Council's response to weaponised migration is constrained by several structural and political limitations. Foremost among these is the veto power held by the five permanent members (P5), which often politicizes discussions and inhibits collective action when alleged perpetrators are strategic allies or veto-wielding states themselves. This dynamic creates a paradox in which the Council, tasked with maintaining international peace and security, may be rendered inactive precisely when decisive action is most required.

In addition, the Council lacks enforcement mechanisms specifically tailored to address migration-related coercion. Existing international frameworks prioritize refugee protection and asylum obligations but offer limited tools for addressing the deliberate engineering of migration flows by states. The Security Council therefore remains heavily dependent on member state cooperation, both for information-sharing and for the implementation of any measures it authorizes.

A further limitation lies in the absence of universally agreed criteria to establish coercive intent. Distinguishing between spontaneous displacement driven by humanitarian necessity and migration flows deliberately induced for political pressure is inherently complex. Without clear standards to assess intent, attribution of responsibility becomes contested, further discouraging decisive Council engagement.

While these constraints explain the Security Council's cautious approach, caution alone cannot justify sustained inaction. When migration is deliberately induced or manipulated as a form of retaliation, coercion, or pressure between states, the consequences extend beyond humanitarian concern and begin to undermine regional stability, bilateral relations, and international norms. Failure to acknowledge this evolution risks normalizing a hybrid tactic that exploits vulnerable populations while eroding the credibility of collective security mechanisms.

At the same time, Council members remain wary that securitising migration could undermine refugee protection regimes or legitimize restrictive migration policies under the guise of security. This tension has resulted in fragmented and reactive responses, exposing a governance gap in addressing non-traditional threats that operate below the threshold of armed conflict.

This dilemma highlights the necessity of developing analytical frameworks that allow the Security Council to respond proportionately and responsibly. Clear criteria are needed to distinguish between spontaneous displacement and induced or engineered migration, as well as indicators that may suggest coercive intent, such as state facilitation, temporal links to sanctions or diplomatic disputes, and explicit political threats. Such a framework would reduce the risk of both abuse and overreaction, enabling the Council to uphold humanitarian principles while addressing genuine security threats.

Ultimately, Subtopic A confronts delegates with a central dilemma: over-securitisation of migration risks human rights violations and the erosion of asylum norms, while under-response enables escalation, normalizes coercive practices, and inflicts long-term harm on refugee protection systems. Navigating this balance remains one of the most pressing challenges facing the Security Council in an era of hybrid and non-traditional threats.

5.1.1 Guiding Questions for Subtopic A

At what point can the deliberate instrumentalisation of migration be considered a threat to international peace and security under Article 39 of the UN Charter? Should intent, scale, duration, or impact on interstate relations be prioritized when assessing this threshold?

How can the Security Council distinguish between spontaneous or conflict-driven displacement and state-engineered migration used for political or strategic coercion? What indicators or evidentiary standards could be used without undermining humanitarian protections?

3. **To what extent does the Security Council’s use of its existing tools—such as sanctions, diplomatic pressure, or monitoring mechanisms—adequately address weaponised migration without contributing to the securitisation of refugee movements?**
4. **How does the veto power of the permanent members affect the Security Council’s credibility and effectiveness in responding to non-traditional and hybrid threats such as weaponised migration?** Should institutional restraint be viewed as a safeguard against escalation or as a limitation that enables coercive state behavior?
5. **How can the Security Council reconcile its mandate to maintain international peace and security with its responsibility to uphold international humanitarian and refugee law, particularly the principle of non-refoulement?**
6. **What risks arise from both over-securitising and under-addressing migration in the context of international peace and security?** How might either

5.2 SUBTOPIC B: Assessing the 2021 Belarus–Poland border crisis as a precedent of state-engineered migration used to pressure neighboring countries

The 2021 Belarus–Poland border crisis is frequently cited as a contemporary case study of state-engineered migration employed as a tool of political pressure. Emerging amid heightened diplomatic tensions between Belarus and the European Union, the crisis provides a concrete example of how migration flows can be strategically manipulated to generate instability, challenge border governance, and exert coercive leverage without resorting to direct military force. Subtopic B evaluates this crisis as a precedent for understanding weaponised migration and its implications for international security.

Following the European Union’s imposition of sanctions on Belarus in response to contested elections and human rights violations, Belarusian authorities were accused by EU officials of deliberately facilitating the movement of migrants from the Middle East and Africa toward the EU’s external borders. Reports indicated that visa procedures were eased, state-linked travel routes were expanded, and migrants were transported toward specific border areas adjacent to Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia.

Assessments by European institutions emphasized that these movements were not spontaneous humanitarian flows, but were temporally and politically linked to diplomatic retaliation. Official rhetoric and the redirection of migrants toward fortified border zones reinforced perceptions of coercive intent. As a result, EU policymakers and security analysts framed the situation as a form of hybrid pressure, in which migration was used to impose political, economic, and social strain on neighboring states while remaining below the threshold of armed conflict.

The crisis generated significant strain on border management systems and asylum procedures in affected states, while simultaneously exposing migrants to harsh and often life-threatening conditions. Measures taken in response, including pushbacks and emergency border restrictions, raised serious concerns regarding compliance with international humanitarian and refugee law. This dual impact underscores how weaponised migration not only destabilizes interstate relations but also exacerbates the vulnerability of displaced populations caught between competing political interests.

The Belarus–Poland border crisis demonstrates how migration can be transformed into a strategic tool capable of destabilizing regions, polarizing domestic politics, and challenging existing legal frameworks. It highlights the difficulty of responding to coercive practices that exploit humanitarian systems without undermining the protections those systems are designed to uphold. As such, the case raises broader questions about the adequacy of current international mechanisms to deter state-engineered migration and the role of the Security Council in addressing hybrid threats that fall outside traditional conflict paradigms.

5.2.1 Guiding Questions for Subtopic B

1. **To what extent can the 2021 Belarus–Poland border crisis be classified as a case of weaponised or instrumentalised migration rather than a spontaneous humanitarian emergency?**

What indicators suggest deliberate state facilitation or coercive intent?

How can intent be assessed without undermining humanitarian protections?

2. **What criteria should the international community use to determine when a state bears responsibility for inducing or redirecting migration flows?**

Should responsibility be linked to state policies such as visa facilitation, transport arrangements, or border direction?

How high should the evidentiary threshold be before international action is justified?

3. Did the Belarus–Poland crisis meet the threshold of a “threat to international peace and security” under Article 39 of the UN Charter?

How should the Security Council interpret non-military coercion and hybrid pressure in this context?

Does regional destabilization alone warrant Security Council engagement?

4. How should the Security Council balance the protection of state sovereignty with the need to respond to state-engineered migration that affects multiple countries? Where does non-interference under Article 2(7) end when actions have transnational security consequences?

5. What responsibilities do receiving states have when responding to allegedly weaponised migration, particularly regarding compliance with international refugee and human rights law?

Can emergency border measures be justified without violating the principle of non-refoulement?

How should the Council assess proportionality in state responses?

6. What role, if any, should the Security Council play when regional organizations label migration crises as hybrid threats?

Should the UNSC defer to regional assessments, such as those of the European Union or NATO?

How can coordination between regional bodies and the UN be strengthened?

7. Does the Belarus–Poland border crisis set a precedent that risks normalizing migration as a coercive tool in international relations?

What preventive measures could the Security Council adopt to discourage similar strategies elsewhere?

8. How can the Security Council respond to cases of weaponised migration without contributing to the securitisation of refugees themselves?

What safeguards are necessary to ensure that displaced individuals are not treated as security threats?

5. STAKEHOLDER POSITIONS & POWER BLOCKS

UNITED STATES

- The United States is one of the strongest advocates for recognizing state-engineered migration as a matter of international peace and security when it is deliberately used to coerce or destabilize other states. In relation to Sub-Topic A, the United States argues that the Security Council can address such practices while still upholding international humanitarian law, emphasizing that migrants themselves must not be criminalized. During Security Council discussions on the 2021 Belarus–Poland border crisis, the United States condemned what it described as the orchestrated instrumentalization of migrants by Belarus and supported raising the issue before the Council as a destabilizing hybrid tactic. This position reflects the broader U.S. approach of expanding the Council’s understanding of security threats beyond conventional military conflict.

RUSSIA

- Russia is the principal veto power opposing the securitization of migration within the Security Council, particularly when such framing implicates allied states. Under Sub-Topic A, Russia argues that migration should remain within humanitarian and national jurisdiction frameworks rather than the Council’s security mandate, warning that redefining migration as a threat could justify interference and militarized border responses. Regarding Sub-Topic B, Russia rejected accusations that Belarus engineered the migration crisis, instead attributing the situation to European migration policies and regional instability. Russia’s veto power makes it a decisive actor capable of blocking any resolution that seeks to formally label weaponized migration as a threat to international peace and security.

CHINA

- China consistently emphasizes state sovereignty, non-interference, and institutional restraint in debates concerning migration and international security. Under Sub-Topic A, China argues that the Security Council should not broaden its mandate to securitize migration, warning that such an approach risks politicizing humanitarian issues and creating precedents for intervention in domestic affairs. China maintains that migration challenges are best addressed through development assistance, humanitarian cooperation, and respect for national border control rather than coercive or punitive measures authorized by the Council. In the context of the Belarus–Poland border crisis, China avoided explicit attribution of responsibility and refrained from endorsing claims of state-engineered migration, instead calling for dialogue and humanitarian solutions.

FRANCE

- France adopts a position that bridges humanitarian protection and security responsibility, arguing that the Security Council must respond when migration is deliberately manipulated as a tool of political pressure. Under Sub-Topic A, France emphasizes that upholding international humanitarian and refugee law does not preclude recognizing the security implications of state-engineered migration, particularly when such actions are intended to destabilize neighboring states or regions. France has supported a broader understanding of hybrid threats within the Council, asserting that non-military coercive tactics can still fall within the UNSC’s peace and security mandate. In relation to the 2021 Belarus–Poland border crisis, France supported bringing the issue before the Security Council and characterized Belarus’s actions as an intentional exploitation of vulnerable populations to exert pressure on the European Union. As a permanent member, France plays a key role in shaping Council language, mediating between European concerns and broader international norms, and sustaining political momentum for Council engagement even in the face of potential vetoes.

UNITED KINGDOM

- The United Kingdom supports recognizing the deliberate manipulation of migration as a potential threat to international peace and security, while stressing that humanitarian law and refugee protections must remain central. Under Sub-Topic A, the United Kingdom has argued that the Security Council must adapt to non-traditional hybrid threats without undermining the legal protections afforded to civilians, highlighting that weaponized migration represents a modern tool of coercion that can destabilize regions even without direct military engagement. Regarding Sub-Topic B, the United Kingdom criticized Belarus for facilitating irregular migration flows toward Poland and other EU member states, describing the actions as politically motivated and deliberately destabilizing. The United Kingdom has consistently supported international scrutiny, including through UNSC discussions, and advocates for measures that combine accountability, early warning mechanisms, and humanitarian assistance.

POLAND

- Poland is the most significant non-veto delegation in this debate, as it is the primary state affected by the Belarus–Poland border crisis, which serves as the central precedent under Sub-Topic B. Poland has consistently characterized the crisis as a deliberate act of hybrid aggression in which Belarus facilitated irregular migration to pressure Poland and destabilize the European Union. Under Sub-Topic A, Poland argues that international humanitarian frameworks must account for situations where migration is artificially induced for political leverage, asserting that security responses and humanitarian obligations must be carefully balanced. Poland emphasizes the practical challenges faced at the border, including large-scale irregular crossings and logistical and humanitarian strain, highlighting the need for clear international norms on weaponized migration.

7. DOCUMENTS SAMPLE

7.1 SAMPLE Opening speech

Greetings honorable chair, distinguished delegates, and others present.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea takes the floor of this assembly today, not as a precursor of conflict, but as a sovereign nation determined to preserve its independence, and right to self-defense in an increasingly eruptive world.

For decades, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has been the subject of undue scrutiny and unilateral pressure. Let the delegation be clear: its nuclear program is a product of survival, not aggression. It is a defensive measure in response to decades of hostility, military buildup, and broken promises. The history of the Korean Peninsula is not one of provocation by the DPRK alone, but of repeated instances where trust was undermined by external actors who preach peace while preparing for conflict.

The delegation doesn't seek conflict, it seeks security—it doesn't aim to threaten, it's aimed to be respected. If international security is truly the concern, then this assembly must equally address the militarization of the region, to ensure that it matches its double standards in nuclear disarmament.

With this the delegation of North Korea concludes, let this be a forum of fairness, where history is acknowledged, and peace is pursued through dialogue—not criticism nor condemnation.

Thank you.

7.2 SAMPLE Position Paper

POSITION PAPER

Committee: Disarmament and International Security Committee

Topic: Reinforcing nuclear non-proliferation amid geopolitical tensions

Sub-topic 1: The Future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Amid Tensions Between Nuclear Powers

Sub-topic 2: The Role of Emerging Technologies and Arsenal Modernization in Heightening the Risk of Armed Conflict Between Nations

Sub-Topic 3: Cybersecurity and the Militarization of Cyberspace: Emerging Threats to International Peace

- ECONOMICAL CONTEXT

THE ECONOMY OF FRANCE IS A HIGHLY DEVELOPED SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMY WITH NOTABLE STATE PARTICIPATION IN STRATEGIC SECTORS. IT IS THE WORLD'S SEVENTH-LARGEST ECONOMY BY NOMINAL GDP AND THE NINTH-LARGEST ECONOMY BY PPP, CONSTITUTING AROUND 4% OF WORLD GDP. DUE TO A VOLATILE CURRENCY EXCHANGE RATE, FRANCE'S GDP AS MEASURED IN DOLLARS FLUCTUATES SHARPLY, BEING SMALLER IN 2024 THAN IN 2008. FRANCE HAS A DIVERSIFIED ECONOMY, THAT IS DOMINATED BY THE SERVICE SECTOR (WHICH IN 2017 REPRESENTED 78.8% OF ITS GDP), WHILST THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR ACCOUNTED FOR 19.5% OF ITS GDP AND THE PRIMARY SECTOR ACCOUNTED FOR THE REMAINING 1.7%. IN 2020, FRANCE WAS THE LARGEST FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT RECIPIENT IN EUROPE, AND EUROPE'S SECOND-LARGEST SPENDER IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. IT WAS RANKED AMONG THE 10 MOST INNOVATIVE COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD BY THE 2020 BLOOMBERG INNOVATION INDEX, AS WELL AS THE 15TH MOST COMPETITIVE NATION GLOBALLY ACCORDING TO THE 2019 GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT (UP 2 NOTCHES COMPARED TO 2018). IT WAS THE FIFTH-LARGEST TRADING NATION IN THE WORLD (AND SECOND IN EUROPE AFTER GERMANY). FRANCE IS ALSO THE MOST VISITED DESTINATION IN THE WORLD, AS WELL AS THE EUROPEAN UNION'S LEADING AGRICULTURAL POWER.

ACCORDING TO THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF), IN 2023, FRANCE WAS THE WORLD'S 23RD COUNTRY BY GDP PER CAPITA WITH \$44,408 PER INHABITANT. IN 2021, FRANCE WAS LISTED ON THE UNITED NATIONS'S HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX WITH A VALUE OF 0.903 (INDICATING VERY HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT) AND 22ND ON THE CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX IN 2021. AMONG OECD MEMBERS, FRANCE HAS A HIGHLY EFFICIENT AND STRONG SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, WHICH COMPRISES ROUGHLY 31.7% OF GDP.

PARIS IS A LEADING GLOBAL CITY, AND HAS ONE OF THE LARGEST CITY GDP IN THE WORLD. IT RANKS AS THE FIRST CITY IN EUROPE (AND 3RD WORLDWIDE) BY THE NUMBER OF COMPANIES CLASSIFIED IN FORTUNE'S FORTUNE GLOBAL 500. PARIS PRODUCED US\$738 BILLION (OR US\$882 BILLION AT MARKET EXCHANGE RATES) OR AROUND 1/3 OF THE FRENCH ECONOMY IN 2018 WHILE THE ECONOMY OF THE PARIS METROPOLITAN AREA—THE LARGEST IN EUROPE WITH LONDON—GENERATES AROUND 1/3 OF FRANCE'S GDP OR AROUND \$1.0 TRILLION. PARIS HAS BEEN RANKED AS THE 2ND MOST ATTRACTIVE GLOBAL CITY IN THE WORLD IN 2019 BY KPMG. LA DÉFENSE, PARIS'S CENTRAL BUSINESS DISTRICT, WAS RANKED BY ERNST & YOUNG IN 2017 AS THE LEADING BUSINESS DISTRICT IN CONTINENTAL EUROPE, AND FOURTH IN THE WORLD.[50]. THE OECD IS HEADQUARTERED IN PARIS, THE NATION'S FINANCIAL CAPITAL. THE OTHER MAJOR ECONOMIC CENTRES OF THE COUNTRY INCLUDE LYON, TOULOUSE (CENTRE OF THE EUROPEAN AEROSPACE INDUSTRY), MARSEILLE AND LILLE.

France's economy entered the recession of the late 2000s later and appeared to leave it earlier than most affected economies, only enduring four-quarters of contraction. However, France experienced stagnant growth between 2012 and 2014, with the economy expanding by 0% in 2012, 0.8% in 2013 and 0.2% in 2014. Growth picked up in 2015 with a growth of 0.8%. This was followed by a growth of 1.1% for 2016, a growth of 2.2% for 2017, and a growth of 2.1% for 2018. According to INSEE (2021), non-financial and non-agricultural medium-sized


FIRMS EMPLOYED 3 MILLION FULL-TIME EQUIVALENT EMPLOYEES (24.3% OF THE WORKFORCE), ACCOUNTED FOR 27% OF INVESTMENT, 30% OF TURNOVER, AND 26% OF VALUE ADDED, DESPITE ACCOUNTING FOR ONLY 1.6% OF TOTAL FIRMS IN FRANCE.

- POLITICAL & SOCIAL CONTEXT

WHEN FRANCE FELL INTO POLITICAL TURMOIL AFTER THE MAY 1958 INSURRECTION IN ALGERIA (THEN STILL A FRENCH COLONY), GENERAL CHARLES DE GAULLE, AN OUTSPOKEN CRITIC OF THE POSTWAR CONSTITUTION WHO HAD SERVED AS THE PROVISIONAL HEAD OF GOVERNMENT IN THE MID-1940S, RETURNED TO POLITICAL LIFE AS PRIME MINISTER. HE FORMED A GOVERNMENT AND, THROUGH THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF JUNE 1958, WAS GRANTED RESPONSIBILITY FOR DRAFTING A NEW CONSTITUTION. WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF MICHEL DEBRÉ, DE GAULLE CRAFTED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FIFTH REPUBLIC. THE DRAFTING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FIFTH REPUBLIC AND ITS PROMULGATION ON OCTOBER 4, 1958, DIFFERED IN THREE MAIN WAYS FROM THE FORMER CONSTITUTIONS OF 1875 (THIRD REPUBLIC) AND 1946 (FOURTH REPUBLIC): FIRST, THE PARLIAMENT DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN ITS DRAFTING, WHICH WAS DONE BY A GOVERNMENT WORKING PARTY AIDED BY A CONSTITUTIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE AND THE COUNCIL OF STATE; SECOND, FRENCH OVERSEAS TERRITORIES PARTICIPATED IN THE REFERENDUM THAT RATIFIED IT ON SEPTEMBER 28, 1958; AND, THIRD, INITIAL ACCEPTANCE WAS WIDESPREAD, UNLIKE THE 1946 CONSTITUTION, WHICH ON FIRST DRAFT WAS REJECTED BY POPULAR REFERENDUM AND THEN IN A REVISED FORM WAS ONLY NARROWLY APPROVED. IN CONTRAST, THE 1958 CONSTITUTION WAS CONTESTED BY 85 PERCENT OF THE ELECTORATE, OF WHICH 79 PERCENT WERE IN FAVOUR; AMONG THE OVERSEAS TERRITORIES ONLY GUINEA REJECTED THE NEW CONSTITUTION AND CONSEQUENTLY WITHDREW FROM THE FRENCH COMMUNITY.

THE FRENCH ARE, PARADOXICALLY, STRONGLY CONSCIOUS OF BELONGING TO A SINGLE NATION, BUT THEY HARDLY CONSTITUTE A UNIFIED ETHNIC GROUP BY ANY SCIENTIFIC GAUGE. BEFORE THE OFFICIAL DISCOVERY OF THE AMERICAS AT THE END OF THE 15TH CENTURY, FRANCE, LOCATED ON THE WESTERN EXTREMITY OF THE OLD WORLD, WAS REGARDED FOR CENTURIES BY EUROPEANS AS BEING NEAR THE EDGE OF THE KNOWN WORLD. GENERATIONS OF DIFFERENT MIGRANTS TRAVELING BY WAY OF THE MEDITERRANEAN FROM THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA AND THROUGH EUROPE FROM CENTRAL ASIA AND THE NORDIC LANDS SETTLED PERMANENTLY IN FRANCE, FORMING A VARIEGATED GROUPING, ALMOST LIKE A SERIES OF GEOLOGIC STRATA, SINCE THEY WERE UNABLE TO MIGRATE ANY FARTHER. PERHAPS THE OLDEST REFLECTION OF THESE MIGRATIONS IS FURNISHED BY THE BASQUE PEOPLE, WHO LIVE IN AN ISOLATED AREA WEST OF THE PYRENEES IN BOTH SPAIN AND FRANCE, WHO SPEAK A LANGUAGE UNRELATED TO OTHER EUROPEAN LANGUAGES, AND WHOSE ORIGIN REMAINS UNCLEAR. THE CELTIC TRIBES, KNOWN TO THE ROMANS AS GAULS, SPREAD FROM CENTRAL EUROPE IN THE PERIOD 500 BCE-500 CE TO PROVIDE FRANCE WITH A MAJOR COMPONENT OF ITS POPULATION, ESPECIALLY IN THE CENTRE AND WEST. AT THE FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE, THERE WAS A POWERFUL PENETRATION OF GERMANIC (TEUTONIC) PEOPLES, ESPECIALLY IN NORTHERN AND EASTERN FRANCE. THE INCURSION OF THE NORSEMEN (VIKINGS) BROUGHT FURTHER GERMANIC INFLUENCE. IN ADDITION TO THESE MANY MIGRATIONS, FRANCE WAS, OVER THE CENTURIES, THE FIELD OF NUMEROUS BATTLES AND OF PROLONGED OCCUPATIONS BEFORE BECOMING, IN THE 19TH AND ESPECIALLY IN THE 20TH CENTURY, THE PRIMERECEPIENT OF FOREIGN IMMIGRATION.

France ethnic composition (2000)



- ALLIED COUNTRIES

UNITED STATES
 UNITED KINGDOM
 GERMANY
 CHINA
 PORTUGAL

- POSITION REGARDING THE TOPIC

AS A PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND A NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATE IN THE TERMS OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT), FRANCE HAS SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES TO PROTECT AND BOLSTER INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. ITS ACTION IN THE FIELDS OF COUNTERING PROLIFERATION, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THIS DUAL RESPONSIBILITY. IT SUPPORTS THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION SYSTEMS, AND PARTICIPATES IN CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AND SECURITY MEASURES DESIGNED TO ENSURE STABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. IT TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY CONDITIONS AND CHANGES TO THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT, WHILE LOOKING FOR BROAD INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY.

FRANCE IS COMMITTED TO NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, THE FIRST PILLAR OF THE NPT. FRANCE TAKES A THREE-PRONGED APPROACH:

- ADOPTING A PROGRESSIVE AND PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE VI OF THE NPT RESPECTING THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL.
- TAKING CONCRETE ACTION FOR DISARMAMENT BY REDUCING ITS ARSENAL TO THE LOWEST LEVEL COMPATIBLE WITH THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT AND IRREVERSIBLY DISMANTLING ITS FISSILE MATERIALS PRODUCTION FACILITIES FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN COMPLETE TRANSPARENCY.
- SETTING PRIORITIES TO CONTINUE DISARMAMENT GRADUALLY, PARTICULARLY BY COMPLETING THE NEXT STEPS WHICH ARE THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY (CTBT); NEGOTIATING A FISSILE MISSILE MATERIAL CUT-OFF TREATY (FMCT) AT THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT; AND CONTINUING WORK ON THE VERIFICATION OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND EFFORTS ON ARMS CONTROL.

FRANCE HAS CONSISTENTLY VOTED AGAINST AN ANNUAL UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION SINCE 2018 THAT WELCOMES THE ADOPTION OF THE TPNW AND CALLS UPON ALL STATES TO SIGN, RATIFY, OR ACCEDE TO IT "AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE".

ALONG WITH OTHER NUCLEAR-ARMED STATES, FRANCE HAS SAID THAT IT DOES "NOT ACCEPT ANY CLAIM THAT [THE TPNW] CONTRIBUTES TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW". IT HAS CALLED ON ALL STATES THAT ARE CONSIDERING SUPPORTING THE TPNW "TO REFLECT SERIOUSLY ON ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY". IN 2022, THE FRENCH PRESIDENT, EMMANUEL MACRON, ISSUED A JOINT STATEMENT WITH HIS US COUNTERPART, JOE BIDEN, IN WHICH THEY REAFFIRMED THEIR OPPOSITION TO THE TPNW, ARGUING THAT IT DOES NOT "REFLECT THE INCREASINGLY CHALLENGING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND IS AT ODDS WITH THE EXISTING NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT ARCHITECTURE". IN 2024, FRANCE ARGUED THAT IT "THE TPNW IS NEITHER COMPLEMENTARY TO NOR COMPATIBLE WITH" THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY OF 1968, AND IT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN "EFFECTIVE MEASURE" AS REQUIRED BY ARTICLE VI OF THAT TREATY. "NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, TO BE REALISTIC AND CREDIBLE, CANNOT IGNORE THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT IN WHICH WE OPERATE," IT SAID. FRANCE HAS ACTIVELY DISCOURAGED OTHER STATES FROM JOINING THE TPNW, INCLUDING AUSTRALIA AND AFRICAN STATES THAT WERE ONCE UNDER ITS COLONIAL RULE.

7.3 SAMPLE Resolution Paper

COMMITTEE: DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE
TOPIC: ILLICIT ARMS TRADE IN CONFLICT ZONES: THE BLACK MARKET CIRCULATION OF WEAPONS INTENSIFIES CIVIL WARS AND DESTABILIZES FRAGILE REGIONS, PARTICULARLY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA.

WORKING PAPER 1.1.2

HEAD OF BLOCKS: STATE OF ISRAEL, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

SPONSORING COUNTRIES: DOMINION OF CANADA, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, FRENCH REPUBLIC, KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, STATE OF ISRAEL, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

SIGNATORY COUNTRIES: ANNEX 1

TO THE DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE,

ACKNOWLEDGING THE PERSISTENT THREAT POSED BY THE ILLICIT CIRCULATION OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS, WHICH FUELS ONGOING CONFLICTS AND UNDERMINES PEACEBUILDING EFFORTS IN REGIONS SUCH AS THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA,

DEEPLY DISTURBED BY THE CORRELATION BETWEEN THE BLACK MARKET TRADE OF ARMS AND THE ESCALATION OF VIOLENCE, TERRORISM, AND HUMANITARIAN CRISES IN FRAGILE STATES,

RECOGNIZING THAT INSUFFICIENT BORDER CONTROL, FRAUD, AND WEAK GOVERNANCE CONTRIBUTE TO THE PERSISTENCE OF ILLICIT ARMS NETWORKS,

EMPHASIZING THE NECESSITY OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, INTELLIGENCE SHARING, AND TECHNOLOGICAL MECHANISMS TO TRACE AND INTERCEPT ILLEGAL WEAPON TRANSFERS,

NOTING WITH REGRET THAT THE PROLIFERATION OF ILLICIT ARMS HAS HINDERED POST-CONFLICT RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT ACROSS SEVERAL AFRICAN AND MIDDLE EASTERN NATIONS,

ENCOURAGED BY THE GROWING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR INITIATIVES PROMOTING TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN ARMS TRANSACTIONS TO PREVENT THEIR DIVERSION TO NON-STATE ACTORS,

RESOLVES,

1. CONDEMNS THE CONTINUED INVOLVEMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN IN THE ILLICIT TRANSFER AND PROLIFERATION OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS TO NON-STATE ACTORS IN CONFLICT ZONES, WHICH FUELS VIOLENCE AND UNDERMINES INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY;
2. CALLS UPON ALL MEMBER STATES TO ENHANCE BORDER CONTROL COOPERATION, INTELLIGENCE SHARING, AND MARITIME SURVEILLANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA TO DISRUPT BLACK-MARKET ARMS NETWORKS;
3. DECIDES TO IMPOSE TARGETED ECONOMIC AND DIPLOMATIC SANCTIONS ON INDIVIDUALS, ENTITIES, AND GOVERNMENT BODIES PROVEN TO FACILITATE OR FINANCE THE ILLEGAL ARMS TRADE IN VIOLATION OF EXISTING UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS;
4. COMMENDS REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS THAT HAVE SUCCESSFULLY IMPLEMENTED DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILIZATION PROGRAMS, AND EXPRESSES ITS HOPE THAT SIMILAR FRAMEWORKS BE EXPANDED ACROSS FRAGILE STATES IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST;
5. URGES THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO APPLY THE I.R.O.N. POA AND RECOMMENDS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A TRANSPARENT MONITORING MECHANISM TO TRACK ARMS FLOWS IN AND OUT OF SANCTIONED REGIONS;
6. FURTHER REMINDS MEMBER STATES OF THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER PRIOR DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE RESOLUTIONS ADDRESSING ILLICIT ARMS TRANSFERS, AND REITERATES THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN HOLDING VIOLATORS ACCOUNTABLE;
7. EXPRESSES ITS REGRET OVER THE HUMANITARIAN CONSEQUENCES OF THE ILLEGAL CIRCULATION OF ARMS;
8. EXPRESSES ITS SYMPATHY TO AFFECTED CIVILIAN POPULATIONS, AND RENEWS ITS APPEAL FOR INCREASED HUMANITARIAN AID AND POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING IN CONFLICT-TORN REGIONS.